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Introduction 
In this paper, I want to examine and challenge certain 
criticisms of Dewey's conception of authority. These criti-
cisms are, broadly speaking, of two species. The first set of 
criticisms involves what critics have labeled Dewey's "strong" 
authority. These critics, the so-called "Illinois Revisionists," 
argue that embedded in Dewey's social and educational 
philosophy are assumptions about authority that lead the 
critics to speculate that the legitimation of authority is predi-
cated upon an expert, professional class. This class maintains 
power and social control through the use of scientific, tech-
nical, and rational means. In terms of education, these critics 
conclude that schooling is a vehicle for the inculcation of 
positive values regarding science and technology and their 
importance in the modern world. 
A second set of criticisms comes from the historian John 
Patrick Diggins, who argues Dewey as having a "weak" 
conception of authority. The argument here is that, as Dewey 
presupposes no metaphysical ends, and no fixed historical 
knowledge to draw upon, little is left over to hitch authority 
onto in terms of social control. What is left are individual 
experiences; clearly not enough to make value judgments re-
garding social issues. Furthermore and with respect to 
education, as teacher authority is said by Dewey to be mini-
mal, and no fixed, philosophical educational "ends" are 
allowable, there is little to guide authority in determining 
future educational direction. 
I intend to explore these arguments further, and then to 
challenge them. This will occur through a reconsideration of 
Dewey's position on authority-both social and educational. 
After completing this reconsideration, I will be in a position 
to bring the completed results to bear on the criticisms them-
selves. My thesis is that, while Dewey is clearly able to 
refute certain of these criticisms, others continue to hold. In 
particular, I concur with those arguments that read Dewey as 
having posited no metaphysical or educational "ends" and 
further positing that these ends are necessary ones if any-
thing other than a contingent authority is to evolve. I main-
tain that Diggins and those who agree with him will not be 
satisfied by Dewey's response. 
Part 1: The Challenge to Authority 
There have been several challenges to Dewey's estima-
tion of the role and scope of authority. A number of these 
challenges developed out of an increasing discomfort with 
the socially and economically conservative American politi-
cal scene of the 1950's. Pragmatism, viewed as a philosophi-
cal tool for increasingly authoritarian government, came into 
disrepute in the 1960's, as a more broadly leftist, revisionist 
assault on American politics and culture emerged. Works such 
as Cristopher Lasch's The New Radicalism in America, criti-
cal as it was of the Liberal state and in particular, pragmatism 
and its later progressivist manifestation, led to a flurry of 
theses to the effect that "the manipulative note was rarely 
absent from their writings: the insistence that men could best 
be controlled and directed not by the old crude method of 
force but by 'education' in its broadest sense...[T]he 
progressives' faith in education...often served as a rational-
ization for a crude will to power on the part of the intellectu-
als themselves" (1965, p. 146). 
Of course those fearful of the effects of the growing 
bureaucratic technocracy did not maintain a stranglehold on 
criticism of the progressivist movement. Inasmuch as 
progressivism was tied to the larger philosophical base that 
was pragmatism, social critics of the more traditionalist bent 
who insisted on a firm metaphysical foundation for social 
planning found Dewey and his followers short on provisions 
as well. A metaphysically bereft philosophy left nothing but 
an anemic conception of authority based not upon timeless 
principles, rather the vagaries of science and experimenta-
tion. Robert Hutchins provides a clear example of this line of 
thinking. "The difference between us and Mr. Dewey is that 
we can defend Mr. Dewey's [social] goals and Mr. Dewey 
cannot. All he can do is say he is for them. He cannot say 
why, because he can appeal only to science, and science 
cannot tell him why he should be for science or for democ-
racy or for human ends" (1944, p. 1316). 
More recent criticisms of Dewey's pragmatic concep-
tion of authority owe their allegiance to these earlier ones. 
Criticisms of Dewey's crypto-authoritarian model of progres-
sive education, together with criticisms of Dewey as having 
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an inadequate conception of authority for lack of a 
foundationalist metaphysics, stand fast. I wish now to 
develop more closely some of the arguments on both sides of 
this debate regarding authority, and specifically to ask of each 
side two general questions. The first deals with the belief of 
what, for Dewey, authority amounts to, and the second deals 
with how and who legitimizes or authorizes the authority to 
be utilized. I begin with those critics who I argue posit a 
"strong" view of Deweyan authority and finish with one very 
recent critic who posits a weak view. 
Strong Authority: The Case of the Illinois 
Revisionists 
The Illinois Revisionists, so named by Robert Westbrook 
(1991, p. 186),' are a group of historians and philosophers of 
education who criticize Dewey very broadly for offering "a 
philosophic justification for the dominant economic organi-
zation of the period...[and]...never seriously challenging] 
the power sources within American society" (Karier et al, 
1973, p. 85-86). For Clarence Karier, authority was never 
brute force; rather, it was the insidious social control of fur-
ther and further "scientifically rationalized orderly change..." 
(Karier and Hogan, in Tiles, 1992, p. 113), Dewey's pragma-
tism offered a justification for the crypto-authoritarianism of 
a professionally-managed society through his constant 
pronouncements on the importance of "the faith in progress, 
science and technology and the belief that science and tech-
nology might resolve virtually all social problems..." (Karier 
and Hogan, in Tiles, 1992, p. 113). I turn now to examine 
more closely how this argument works. 
Dewey supposedly advocated a public that was premised 
on the unhindered nature of inquiry. Inquiry was a method, 
chiefly a scientific one, for settling individual, social, politi-
cal, and educational concerns. The factual data that was 
generated by inquiry in its most formalized state lay in the 
domain of academics, scientists, and others primarily belong-
ing to centers of higher education (Karier and Hogan, in Tiles, 
1992, p. 119). The knowledge generated in the universities 
conferred a degree of expertise on those who undertook it, 
and thereby was used to legitimize the newly minted class of 
professionals who went on to transform the social system 
based on their findings (Karier and Hogan, in Tiles, 1992, 
p. 113). 
As professionalized, scientific rationality transformed the 
social system, so it was that increasingly, experts and exper-
tise came to rule politics. The professionalized middle class, 
a class that Dewey himself belonged to (Karier and Hogan, 
in Tiles, p. 112), became the final arbiters of social change. 
Relying on university-based experts, this class utilized a 
rationalized and technological approach to solving social and 
educational concerns; an approach which, characteristically, 
relied not on the public to settle disputes or provide for new 
possibilities, but rather experts of the professional middle 
class's own choosing. The knowledge and decisions of the 
experts would be internalized in the body public such that 
the public would come to see the technico-rational reason-
ing-out of social problems and the resultant social control as 
the norm. Ultimately, it was argued, Dewey advocated the 
"use of state power to control the future through shaping the 
thought, action, and character of its citizens" (Karier et al, 
1973, p. 87). 
Education was of course a major means for state power 
to undertake this process. To inculcate in young, 
fertile minds a sense of the grandeur and importance of 
science, technology, and its potential for solving social prob-
lems, together with the importance of having an "expert" class, 
was said to be a major concern for Dewey. As such, the teacher 
must be at least somewhat authoritarian in her dealings with 
the students. Participatory democracy, while necessary as an 
educational ideal for students and teachers alike, was not 
manifest in the classroom. Rather, teachers, by the very 
nature of the task of promoting and inculcating these new 
values, had to adopt an authoritarian posture in order to 
accomplish necessary instruction. As Mary Ann Ray wid notes 
"Fundamentally incompatible demands push the teacher to 
function more as demagogue than as duly constituted demo-
cratic leader. To be successful educators, teachers must be 
engineers and manipulators of consent, highly accomplished 
at attaching learner purposes to the service of educational 
ends. For Dewey teachers clearly cannot function as teachers 
if classroom decisions actually are made on the basis of one 
vote per person-yet perhaps nothing is more fundamental to 
political democracy than this formal provision for equal 
power" (in Tiles, 1992, p. 257).2 
If all this is true of Dewey's supposedly benign call for 
science and technology to be a central feature of the class-
room, then certain conclusions follow. It is tantamount to 
saying that the need to foster certain intellectual habits in 
individual children licenses the teacher ( and the educational 
"system" and the broader society the teacher represents) to 
manipulate her students in the name of a greater social good. 
One must consider the possibility that this is a variant of 
"pernicious manipulation" as Feinberg calls it (1975, p. 240).3 
That is, a peculiar self-interest is involved in the act of 
manipulation. While it may not seem so, prima facie, because 
the teacher apparently acts in the public's interest, neverthe-
less, it remains problematic because, even if it is not 
obviously pernicious, yet there may be a good argument for 
limiting the amount of manipulation that goes on in the class-
room, as many educators believe the child's innate curiosity 
is what should be further developed, and coercive manipula-
tion on the teacher's part may serve to stifle this. Further, the 
public interest, if we are to believe Karier, is actually the 
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interest of an entrenched expert middle class who represent 
primarily themselves. If the definition of pernicious manipu-
lation is extended to a certain class self-interest, then the 
change may be apropos to Dewey's classroom, and render 
his overall argument problematic. 
To summarize: what we have from the Illinois school 
and like-minded revisionists is a view of Dewey as having a 
strong authoritarian notion of social control. Authority is 
considered coeval with a cryptic, technico-rational social con-
trol. It is vested in a professional class of primarily univer-
sity-based experts who thereby legitimize it. There is little 
opportunity for meaningful public discourse, as peoples are 
manipulated into believing in the possibilities of science and 
technology exclusively, as well as in the necessity of an 
expert "ruling" class. Further, the classroom operates in an 
equally authoritarian manner, as manipulation and control 
must occur if children are to benefit from habitualizing these 
novel social goods. 
Weak Authority: The Case of John Patrick Diggins 
Diggins offers a radically different account of the short-
comings of Deweyan authority. For Diggins, the problem is 
not a cryptic, insidious authority premised on social control 
via a coterie of predominantly university-based, middle class 
professional scientists and researchers. Rather, it concerns 
the lack of a specific and necessary type of authority, one 
connected to agreed upon historical principles or timeless 
metaphysical values that can be hooked onto for stability 
(1994, p. 206).4 
"Dewey had his work cut out for him. Where classical 
writers looked to transcendent ideas or the historical past 
for true knowledge, Dewey looked to probable hypotheses 
and present problems as the place where useful knowledge 
asserts itself. And where ancient philosophers looked to 
thought as the ordering agency that would give society ideas 
at which to aim, Dewey believed that practical activity 
itself could serve as an ideal by which men could order their 
lives. Dewey's pragmatic naturalism, locating the origins 
and validity of ideas in human experience, arrived at a 
conclusion that turned upside down the assumptions of clas-
sical thought: authority, like truth, is neither given by nor 
revealed to the theoretical intellect, but instead is produced 
by human activity" (1994, p. 221). 
Although traditional means of legitimizing authority were 
said to be anathema for Dewey, yet Dewey did indeed have a 
conception of authority. Authority is said by Dewey to be 
found in the "reflective enterprise that enables man [sic] to 
take his bearings in a chaotic world" (1994, p. 226). Author-
ity is vested in one's cognitive and decision-making capa-
bilities, though to be sure, this is not thereby an individualis-
tic enterprise, as Dewey is clear that the formation of one's 
cognitive and decision-making abilities necessitates a shared 
activity. The transformation of authority was a transforma-
tion of authority from a set of political and religious ideals 
under the guise of "duty" and Christian "sacrifice" to what 
Diggins has termed "the reflective enterprise" (1994, p. 215). 
The previous conceptions of authority now serve as the 
enemy of modernity and the triumph of modernity is said to 
be one's own self-interested experience of the chaotic world 
(1994, p. 215). 
Diggins has problems with Dewey's situation of author-
ity in the reflective enterprise of one's own experience. "If 
authority derives from everyday experience, how can the 
contingencies of experience yield order and stability? If 
authority does not lie in a source external to and independent 
of man's actions, how can it govern his actions?" (1994, 
p. 222). Furthermore, Diggins argues that Dewey's insistence 
on placing authority in the sphere of reflective intelligence 
forces authority into the fold of experimentation. This forces 
authority to wait, to suspend judgment until the process of 
verification, of testing, takes place. Unfortunately, Diggins 
argues, a particular direction often needs to be taken before 
experience can render a judgment and authority can pronounce 
that decision as valuable. Thus it is that "if pragmatic knowl-
edge must always be from hindsight, of what value is it in 
guiding our thoughts prior to activity?" (1994, p. 234). 
Finally, Diggins turns to the classroom to examine the 
role and scope of authority in education. Again, Diggins is 
critical: in this instance with respect to Dewey's refusal to 
identify pre-determined ends for education. Diggins argues 
that by not allowing education to define certain pre-
determined ends, and by allowing such nebulous ends as 
"growth" to reign in position of authority over the classroom, 
Dewey cannot say on what basis certain specific educational 
values are to be accepted or determined, whether of the 
student or the teacher, as no end that can serve as a beacon or 
a guide is allowed to exert itself beyond the vague "growth" 
and the too-local "ends-in-view." (1994, p. 314). Once again, 
Dewey's refusal to specify certain philosophic ends that can 
serve as guides forces him to abandon any meaningful 
authority in educational aims in exchange for individual 
self-interest and the contingencies of experience. 
To summarize: Diggins does indeed find Dewey a 
philosopher of authority. But this authority is not one of 
predetermined ends or of certain values. Rather it is the 
authority of reflective experience and intelligent judgment; 
an authority that pronounces over past experience only, and 
cannot serve as a guide to future actions. It is legitimated not 
by any social body, political enterprise, or tradition; rather 
by experience itself, and the judgments therein. As such it is 
a very individual, self-interested authority that has no claims 
on the possibility of future social action. 
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Part 2: Towards a Reconsideration of Dewey's 
Concept of Authority 
I wish now to reconsider Dewey's take on authority 
through an examination of his social, political and educa-
tional works. I say reconsider because, although Dewey 
clearly has a conception of authority, it is often embedded, as 
his critics point out, in social practices, intelligent method, 
the development of habit, and other concrete activities that 
render difficult a precise characterization of just what authority 
is. Clearly though, one must attempt a working characteriza-
tion of authority in order to further attempt its legitimation 
and operation. As Dewey does not provide but a very broad 
one, I choose another to help accomplish this task. Kenneth 
Benne argues that authority occurs when one "...grants 
obedience to another person, to a group, or to a method or 
rule, with a claim to be able to assist him in mediating this 
field of conduct or belief, as a condition of the grant of such 
assistance. Any operating social relationship of this sort is an 
authority relationship" (1938, p. 2). 
Now this working characterization is still very broad, 
but also very much within the spirit of Dewey. It suggests 
that any characterization of authority must have about it quali-
ties of guidance, direction, and relationship. As I will show, 
these qualities serve a very important role in the manner by 
which authority is legitimated. Both Dewey and Dewey's 
critics would agree, I think, with Benne's estimation that au-
thority "is a necessity of all stable community life" (1938, p. 
27). What they would dispute is rather the way in which it is 
manifested, as well as who or how it becomes legitimized. In 
Benne's estimation and in Dewey's estimation as well, 
authority is bound up with "the pervasive contribution of 
scientific findings and method to nearly all functions of 
modern life..." (1938, p. 26). This is just what the Illinois 
school and Diggins want to dispute, though obviously, for 
different reasons. But it will soon become clear that there is 
no extricating Dewey from an insistence that authority is 
bound up with method. Indeed, one might agree with Benne 
inasmuch as, if there were to be one characteristic of method 
that Dewey claims is certain, it is that authority is method: 
the method of organized intelligence (1938, p. 172). 
I will come back to this point shortly. Right now 
however, I want to develop from Dewey the manner in which 
authority manifests itself in social relations. I want to 
construct a model of authority on two levels. The first level 
deals with authority in social and political spheres. The 
second deals with authority in education, and more narrowly, 
the classroom. Both levels of inquiry rest on two as yet 
untested assumptions. The first is that authority is coeval with 
organized intelligence, or method, as Benne insists. The 
second is that it is the public and not any exclusive individual 
or group interest that legitimizes authority. I will proceed first 
to argue that authority for Dewey does equate with organized 
intelligence, and I will discuss what this means. Secondly, I 
will show that organized intelligence is coeval with public 
intelligence. This completed, I will argue that authority is the 
composite of organized public intelligence that all are able to 
participate in, and further, that education, as a broadly public 
venture, is the means by which organized intelligence is 
cultivated. Organized intelligence is the chief goal of educa-
tion on a public level, and represents no one particular group 
or class interest. Once these points are adequately developed 
and addressed, I will be in a position to turn once again to 
Dewey's critics and test out their various estimations of 
authority as it is manifested in Dewey's writings. 
It is in Authority and Social Change that Dewey's stron-
gest statements regarding the nature of authority emerge. "We 
need an authority that, unlike the older forms in which it 
operated, is capable of directing and utilizing change and we 
need a kind of individual freedom unlike that which the un-
restrained economic liberty of individual has produced and 
justified; we need, that is, a kind of individual freedom that 
is general and shared and that has the backing and guidance 
of socially organized intelligent control" (1990, p. 137). Now 
Dewey is referring to a phenomenon he sees as a holdover 
from a previous, laissez-faire style liberalism; one that placed 
individual rights and desires ahead of social ones (1990, 
p. 25). Although this liberalism at one time served well the 
democratic interests, yet it failed to provide an adequate an-
swer to the pressing social problems which are encountered, 
in part, as a result of newer technological possibilities (1990, 
p. 25). Such technological changes bring with them conse-
quences which, if democracy is going to survive and peoples 
prosper, require a fundamental shift from an individualist 
conception of authority as imposition and its opposite as 
being freedom. 
Organized intelligence is the chosen response to laissez-
faire style liberalism. Science is the most reliable evidence 
we have that organized intelligence can solve complex 
public problems (1991, p. 168-169). In the long run, what 
dictates for Dewey the necessity of placing authority in the 
method of organized intelligence is its track record with 
respect to scientific and technological innovations (1990, 
p. 141). By making organized intelligence, and in particular, 
its method, the locus of authority, Dewey is suggesting first 
of all, that anything which is to be given value over other 
determinations is subject to some kind of inquiry, hypothesis 
testing, or experimentation. Secondly, should method deter-
mine that a change in the initial determination is necessary 
owing to new consequences, or new factual data being 
presented, the value placed on that initial determination must 
also change (1991, p. 242-243). With method, the value of 
anything is contingent and cannot be relied upon as a fixed 
principle from which to operate. Although, as Dewey argues, 
one inherits one's morality to a large extent from one's social 
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group via the speech patterns (1988, p. 43), yet the authority 
of this morality, as with the morality itself, is always contin-
gent on further inquiry. If inquiry determines that a particular 
value or moral worth is untenable, then that value or moral 
worth must be questioned. 
Furthermore, organized intelligence is public intelligence. 
The great mass of peoples do not live in isolation from one 
another. They form groups and share interests. They belong 
to communities, societies, and cultures. One might be tempted 
to locate organized intelligence solely in the individual 
experiencer, as many if not all of the laissez-faire individual-
ist models did. However, this, as Dewey argued, presented 
problems because the theory of epistemological "correspon-
dence" that provided the foundation for much of the early 
liberalism was itself faulty. The Lockean/Humean view that 
intelligence arose from the reconstruction of atomistic or iso-
lated events was predicated upon an individualist theory of 
cognition with little to say about how communities, groups, 
societies, and cultures could come to inquire into a particular 
problem (1990, p. 33). A conception of intelligence not 
fastened to an empirical, atomistic psychology was needed if 
a "transformed" liberalism was to emerge. This "transformed" 
intelligence, as with this "transformed" liberalism, was to take 
its bearings not from an individualistic spectator theory of 
the world, rather from a conception of intelligence and 
cognition that involved the organism fused into an organic 
whole with its environment. The focus was not exclusively 
on environment, nor on perceiver, but rather the transforma-
tion of the two through mutual interaction (1988, p. 172). 
What this did for environment was to give it a larger 
stake in the overall process of cognition. Environment, once 
considered of little consequence with regards to the overall 
function of cognition beyond supplying material to be worked 
upon, could now be shown to have a demonstrative effect 
upon the interacting individual. Certain environments, for 
Dewey, were privileged above others. Important for Dewey 
was the environment of other peoples, broadly considered as 
the social or public realm. The manner in which this environ-
ment came to affect particular individuals was via the 
medium of communication. Through the give and take of 
communicative exchange, peoples could be transformed 
(1988, p. 132-134). Organized intelligence involved the 
selective habitualizing of one's responses to this transforma-
tion: it involved active reflection and inquiry in determining 
what the best response to a given social environment would 
be, and what response was to be valued. The procedure of 
organized intelligence, the method of inquiry adopted on a 
social scale, allowed diverse peoples to come together in what 
Dewey called "conjoint communication" around a particular 
social consequence of a private act, (1989, p. 73). These 
consequences could then be deliberated upon, with inquiry 
as the guide. It is in this way that intelligence is transformed 
into a public activity. 
The public is to be the locus of inquiry. But this begs 
immediately the question of who, precisely, constitutes the 
public? Dewey felt the public at the time he wrote to be "lost 
. . .bewildered.. ." (1989, p. 117), and "eclipsed" (1989, 
p. 110). This was due primarily to the overabundance of 
multiple publics, combined with the lack of an effective means 
of shared inquiry. What was necessary in Dewey's estima-
tion was a reconstruction of the public via the instruments of 
inquiry (1989, p. 73). Problems that confronted particular 
publics, particular communities, could be treated in an 
experimental fashion. Solutions to problems of the public were 
to arise out of the examination, testing and predicting of 
potential solutions to these problems. Indeed, the formation 
of public interest was itself the communication of the results 
of this public inquiry (1989, p. 107). In Dewey's estimation, 
all those who have a stake in the consequences of the activity 
of the one or the many have license to participate in this shared 
inquiry, and thereby reap the results. This leaves open the 
possibility that potentially all, inasmuch as certain broad 
social policies affect the mass of peoples, could share in the 
process of deliberative inquiry and the consequences thereby. 
The public, however, does not have all of the tools 
necessary to probe in experimental fashion the consequences 
of particular activities. Inasmuch as certain factual data 
demands precision in its compilation and evaluation, a 
certain expertise is demanded of key players.(Dewey 1976, 
p. 64).5 Now not every individual who constitutes the body 
public is capable of performing these tasks. Thus it falls to 
experts to carry out these needed activities. Experts are for 
Dewey a necessary ingredient in inquiry of a public nature. 
Their role, however, is a rather limited one. Specifically, 
experts in a particular discipline or subject-matter do not 
prescribe, from the results of inquiry, what is to be done. 
Rather, the expert demonstrates to the inquiring public the 
factual data upon which further analysis and pronouncements 
depend. The concerned public, in evaluating the data 
supplied by these experts, must, according to Dewey,".. .have 
the ability to judge of the bearing of the knowledge supplied 
by others upon common concerns" (1989, p. 209). 
The locus for decision-making with respect to the fac-
tual data presented by experts clearly falls upon the concerned 
public. Inasmuch as the public must judge the implications 
of adopting a certain response to shared social problems, the 
public must as well be able to carry out the task of inquiry. 
The authority invested in inquiry and its results demands vigi-
lance on the part of the concerned public with respect to the 
communication of findings and the judgement passed on vari-
ous possible alternatives to problematic situations. This in 
turns demands that the public be properly educated with re-
spect to the tools and capacities of inquiry. Education, that is, 
formal schooling, is the chief vehicle of supply for this 
demand. 
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Dewey's primary purpose of education is often said to 
be "growth" or "direction." While this is certainly true, what 
it implies is nevertheless the capacity and capability of the 
individual to inquire. Inquiry and intelligence are among 
(though by no means only) the chief attributes that education 
must develop (1990, p. 28). Inquiry is necessary because it 
functions as the chief instrument for the necessary communi-
cation and decision-making so important to conceiving and 
maintaining an efficient, democratic public. As such the 
teacher's job is to provide an environment conducive to the 
formation and development of inquiry. She is saddled with 
the responsibility of directing and re-directing the child such 
that the child's own intellectual curiosity can take root and 
blossom into a fully-fledged formalized and habituated 
inquiry (1984, p. 25-26).6 Inasmuch as she helps nurture a 
developing inquiry, she is providing the child with the means 
to authority. 
In this manner, social control in the classroom is 
tantamount to assisting the child, through direction and 
re-direction, to cultivate her own personal capacity for 
inquiry. "Control, in truth, means only an emphatic form of 
direction of powers, and covers the regulation gained by an 
individual through his [sic] own efforts quite as much as that 
brought about when others take the lead" (1990, p. 24). 
Social control is present in the educative process, but it is a 
means only. It serves to guide and direct the child's own 
process of inquiry such that she, once the inquiry is 
habitualized and developed, will have the capacity to deter-
mine for herself whether or not to value or participate in 
certain social activities. It is a necessary means to what Dewey 
terms "freedom." And since freedom "resides in the opera-
tions of intelligent observation and judgement by which a 
purpose is developed, guidance given by the teacher... is an 
aide to freedom, not a restriction upon it" (1991, p. 46). 
The child participates in the direction that the teacher 
sets. As Dewey argues, "nothing can be forced upon them or 
into them" (1984, p. 25). In point of fact, the habits of 
inquiry that the child develops are her own. The experiences 
that help to cultivate those habits are also her own. Dewey 
rejects the blank slate approach to learning, whereby the 
teacher imparts while the student absorbs. Rather, the child 
forms her habits of inquiry through the experiences she has. 
True enough, the teacher provides opportunities for inquiry 
to be used, and in this way prods the inquiry to higher and 
more formalized stages. Dewey certainly applauds some 
degree of social control. But any social control that is mani-
fested by the teacher is to be merely one of direction and re-
direction (1984, p. 26). As Dewey eschewed more direct 
means of authority in his insistence on the rejection of overt 
disciplinary maneuvers and fixed dogmas, it fell to the teacher 
to provide direction and re-direction in the name of the pub-
lic interest. And again, the manner in which this was exerted 
was via the assistance of the teacher in the development of 
the child's specific capacities of inquiry. The fundamental 
means of control ultimately becomes intellectual self-
control through cultivation and application of inquiry (1984, 
p. 33). 
Now I wish to summarize what I have said so far. For 
Dewey, authority is equated with organized intelligence. 
Organized intelligence is akin to inquiry. Inquiry, although 
certainly an individual capacity, is also a broadly social and 
public one. In this manner, organized intelligence exists as a 
public undertaking. Although the public is certainly charged 
with the responsibility of judging the various means for 
addressing social problems, yet it rely's on experts for the 
gathering and distribution of factual data. The public, through 
deliberation and communication of the results of inquiry, 
attempts solutions to pressing concerns. The means for the 
development of inquiry is education. Children (and adults) 
are given direction and re-direction in the cultivation of their 
own innate intellectual curiosity. This is what is meant by 
social control. The result is a habitualized, formal instrument 
of intelligence that is developed via certain experiences and 
opportunities that are consciously guided from without but 
nevertheless developed within. Although the experiences and 
opportunities are to a certain degree shaped and directed, yet 
the inquiry and habits developed are the child's own. Social 
control via the development and guidance of inquiry gradu-
ally shifts to self-control in the utilization of the newly 
developed instrument. The authority of inquiry is therefore 
self-legitimizing: it is legitimized through the activity of the 
inquiring broader public via the formal process of education. 
In this manner inquiry begets and authorizes inquiry. 
Part 3: A Response to Dewey's Critics 
What I wish to attempt here is the bringing to bear of 
Dewey's more fully considered model of inquiry on 
certain arguments of Dewey's critics. I want to reiterate that 
it is inquiry itself that legitimizes its own authority, and not a 
particular class or group of people, as with Karier and the 
Illinois school. But I also want to challenge the reading of 
Diggins, who suggests that Dewey's conception of authority 
is anemic, and, as it lies neither in historical knowledge nor 
in transcendental principles, is of little use in operating as a 
viable mechanism for social situations. 
Let me begin with the Illinois school. Recall that this 
school argued Dewey as having a strong authoritarian view 
of social control. Recall that this authority consisted in a 
certain technico-rational control exerted by a professional, 
middle class typically represented by the university profes-
sor but also by teachers, engineers, and other professionals 
as well. Recall also that this ruling class utilized science and 
technology exclusively to manipulate others into believing 
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in the possibility of such ends. With the Illinois school, 
education became a means to garner control of children and 
to inculcate in them the ideology of the expert, ruling class. 
The Illinois school's argument hinges, I think, on two 
assumptions. The first is that Dewey believed that the middle 
class professionals, the "expert" class, as Karier has labeled 
them, both had and insisted on the means to control broadly 
public discourse on values to be determined, avenues to be 
pursued, and decisions to be made. The second is that Dewey 
believed education served as the locus and opportunity for 
the inculcation of certain values with respect to science and 
technology. To demonstrate that the Illinois school's argu-
ments do not hold hinges on refuting these two claims. 
The first claim is refuted by insisting, once again, that 
Dewey emphatically rejected the idea that an expert ruling 
class dictated social and public policy. Again, experts, as 
Dewey maintains in The Public and its Problems, are there 
to assemble and disseminate factual data. The broader pub-
lic, using the means of organized intelligence, roughly trans-
latable to intelligent inquiry, is to judge, based on the data, 
what the best course of action with respect to the conse-
quences, might be. The experts function as an important means 
in this process. But they do not hold the lion's share of re-
sponsibility in making public decisions regarding the avenues 
to pursue. That they influence the end reached and that they 
do this from a position of non-neutrality is indisputable. It is 
in the realm of the broader public, though, that the claims of 
the experts must be weighed and judged and any decision 
based upon the factual data ultimately arrived at. The experts, 
as Dewey argues, do not reserve this function for themselves. 
As to the second claim, the claim that education serves 
as a means for manipulation and social control, this as well is 
incorrect. Although education certainly does initially serve 
as a means for social control, it does not occur in the manner 
suggested by the Illinois school. Control comes ultimately 
from within the individual experiencing and developing in-
quiry, and not from without. The child "owns" her habits and 
experiences. They were always hers to develop or not. No 
specific inculcation of certain values is thereby suggested by 
Dewey. This includes values attached to science and technol-
ogy. One is not expected to swallow the argument that 
science and technology are universally beneficial. Rather, one 
is expected to inquire about the possibilities of a particular 
science and a particular technology in and for a particular 
situation, a particular context, and then to form a reasoned 
opinion on these based upon available evidence and suggested 
consequences. There is a subtle but significant difference here. 
No particular ideology or argument is suggested by Dewey 
to be habitualized by the child without first passing the test 
of inquiry. If the child determines through inquiring that a 
particular use of technology or science is undesirable, then 
so be it. It is that child's reasoned opinion and that cannot be 
taken away. In this manner, the child, as inquiry becomes 
more and more formalized, is able to determine what to value 
and appreciate based upon her own judgment. Guidance and 
direction, once necessary for this development, gradually 
become less and less a factor. What was once direction and 
re-direction on the part of the teacher passes to self-control 
as intelligence becomes more and more a dominant factor. 
John Patrick Diggins' arguments are ultimately more 
penetrating than the Illinois school's. Recall that Diggins 
argued Dewey a weak philosopher of authority. That is, rather 
than hinging authority on predetermined ends or timeless 
metaphysical principles, authority is equated with experience 
and the judgments based upon experience. It is not legiti-
mized by any particular social body, rather the individual 
experiencer. As such, it becomes a very self-interested 
authority, with little to say over such issues that predomi-
nantly social problems generate. In terms of education, 
Diggins argues that, as there are no pre-determined educa-
tional ends that serve as authoritative markers for guidance 
and control, and, as the teacher is unable to exert any particu-
lar authority, there cannot be a strong enough conception of 
authority in the classroom to render any particular value 
trenchant. 
Now Diggins is absolutely correct about Dewey reject-
ing any metaphysical principles as the authoritative basis for 
subsequent valuation. There is no extricating Dewey from 
this. As a consequence, anyone who posits that antecedent or 
transcendental rights or virtues are a necessary component to 
the social transmission of authority will be unsatisfied with 
Dewey's estimation. Again, there is, I think, no getting around 
this. However, Diggins is incorrect in assuming that because 
Dewey hangs much on individual experience, he thereby has 
little to say regarding authority of a social nature. Diggins 
seems to forget about Dewey's rather strong statements 
regarding authority in his social, political, and educational 
writings, preferring to focus on Dewey's more experiential 
works, such as Experience and Nature. As a consequence, he 
misses much that Dewey has to say about the locus and 
legitimation of authority. If Diggins were to concentrate more 
specifically on works such as Human Nature and Conduct 
and The Public and its Problems, he would find, I think, that 
Dewey has much to say about authority as the organized 
intelligence of a public or social group brought to bear on 
specific problems. True, Diggins is correct when he ascer-
tains that the inquiry manifested by the individual inquirer in 
response to certain experiences is the locus of authority. But 
this applies only to the individual in the context of having 
certain individual experiences. Inasmuch as that individual 
shares and participates in social activities, and the conse-
quences of social activities impact upon her, there is a need 
for that individual's inquiring capacities to be pressed into 
service for the good of the public. In this manner, individual 
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inquiry becomes social inquiry. The results of a group of 
people inquiring about a specific problem or set of antici-
pated consequences are communicated from the group to 
others, so that they may in turn benefit from the process. The 
results of inquiry are themselves deliberated upon. 
Certain results from the inquiry of consequences become 
valued. These values hold until a further problem necessi-
tates their reexamination. These values pass as customs via, 
as Dewey says, the speech patterns of a particular group, to 
that group's progeny. The values hold, in turn, until the 
process of inquiry is developed and formalized in that prog-
eny such that they can make reasonable judgments regarding 
those customs and values. If certain values or customs or 
legislation becomes intolerable due to anticipated or 
unanticipated consequences, those individual inquirers who 
are saddled with the problem must have the opportunity to 
deliberate publicly the various avenues of change. Authority 
is vested in the decisions made by the inquiring public. But 
this authority is contingent upon the possible consequences 
arising from the decisions made. Again, if it is found that the 
consequences of a particular decision necessitate its 
withdrawal in favor of another, the authority to perform the 
activity of withdrawal is provided for and by, public inquiry. 
In this way, the authority of any particular decision only seems 
to reside in the valued decision; in reality, it resides in the 
inquiry itself. But again, this inquiry, while certainly of an 
individual nature, as Diggins correctly points out, is also of a 
public one. Inasmuch as certain values, decisions and legis-
lations of the public serve to affect individuals, the need and 
possibility for a public inquiry manifests itself. This public 
inquiry is saturated with authority, inasmuch as it is the power 
and capacity for organized, intelligent deliberation and 
communication of actions towards anticipated and real 
consequences. As a result, Diggins is incorrect in saddling 
individual experience with being the final arbiter of 
authority. 
As to Diggins' concerns regarding the lack of ends in 
education and the absence of teacher authority, he is, in the 
main, correct. Any ends in education must be determined 
through a procedure of inquiry. These ends are contingent 
ones only. That is, they cannot hold for all time, but must 
surrender themselves as necessary if certain consequences 
dictate. The broad aims of education under the banners of 
"growth" and "inquiry" are certainly no refutation of this. 
Teachers have little traditional authority. They do have the 
means and right to guide and direct children in pursuing their 
own experiences, and it is in this capacity that their authority 
resides, and so Diggins does overstate his argument when he 
posits that teachers lack any authority. Nevertheless, this, I 
do not think, would satisfy Diggins. Inasmuch as this 
authority is not exclusive but rather hinges on the developing 
experiences and inquiry of the children involved, it is of 
itself transient. As children age and their capacity for inquiry 
broadens and formalizes, more and more self-direction seems 
to be involved, and less and less teacher direction is neces-
sary. This is certainly not a strong enough conception of 
teacher authority to satisfy someone who craves "ends" as 
Diggins does. In this respect, Dewey would continue to leave 
Diggins unimpressed. 
Conclusion 
Dewey certainly does have a response to the combined 
criticisms of the Illinois School and John Patrick Diggins. To 
the Illinois School, who complain that Dewey has a strong 
conception of authority bound up in the technico-rational 
enterprise of science and technology led by an elite profes-
sional, middle class, Dewey can retaliate by arguing that it is 
the public who formulate decisions based upon social conse-
quences and not a group of experts. Experts, rather, provide 
factual data that the public then judges. The means forjudg-
ing comes from inquiry, which all are to cultivate, primarily 
through the educational process, whose prime responsibility 
therefore, is assistance with the development of the child's 
own individual inquiring experiences. 
To John Patrick Diggins, Dewey has only a partial 
response. Inasmuch as experience is the means and context 
within which an individual inquires, Diggins is quite correct 
that inquiry is an individual affair. But this individual affair 
becomes public when the activities of others form conse-
quences for the one. The inquiry then shifts to the public 
domain. Through judgment of the consequences, communi-
ties and groups composed of individuals share and deliberate 
on better courses of actions. Policies are produced as a result 
of inquiry taking place within the context of conjoint, public 
communication. What was once an individual affair now 
becomes public as inquiry is charged with finding the best 
course of action for a community of peoples. 
Nevertheless, Diggins is correct in his charge that Dewey 
has no metaphysical conception of authority. There are no 
"ends" that authority can hang onto. Authority, inasmuch as 
it depends on the results of settled inquiry, is contingent. 
Neither the public, the schools, the teachers or the experts 
own it. It comes rather, out of a process of inquiry into 
problematic situations that have a judgment rendered. It 
exists as long as further deliberation does not remove it. In 
the end, it is found among the inquiries themselves, as only 
inquiries have the capacity to authenticate a decision and 
stamp it as of certain value. This is cold comfort to those who 
wish for an authority based upon historical knowledge, meta-
physical ends, religious dogma, or the power of a ruling class. 
However, it is all that Dewey is willing to provide. 
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Notes 
1. Westbrook invokes Clarence Karier, Walter Feinberg, 
David Hogan, and Paul Violas as those revisionist historians 
of the Illinois school. Needless to say, he has little liking for 
them. It should be noted that Feinberg has distanced himself 
from this "revisionist Illinois school," and therefore should 
probably not be included. For more on this distancing, C.F. 
Feinberg, W. (1993, Vol. 43, No. 2. Spring). "Dewey and 
Democracy at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century." 
Educational Theory, pp. 195-216. Also, personal communi-
cation, Jan, 2000. There is a history of this term. Diane Ravitch 
earlier called a number of these critics "the revisionists" in 
her defense of liberal education. C.F. Ravitch, D. (1978). The 
Revisionists Revised. New York: Basic Books. 
2. Interestingly enough, while she suggests students can 
be manipulated, Raywid rejects this hypothesis in a further 
article. Here, she denies that Dewey believed in or held to the 
indoctrination of students. She argued that Dewey correctly 
held that one cannot "stamp in" a commitment to the exer-
cise of intelligence. Rather, this must be developed by the 
individual. C.F. Raywid, M. A. (1992). "The Discovery and 
Rejection of Indoctrination." in John Dewey: Critical Assess-
ments Vol. 2, edited by. J.E. Tiles. London: Routledge p. 300. 
Whether this is tantamount to saying that intelligence cannot 
be habitualized is another matter, though, and depends upon 
what one means precisely by habituation. As I will argue later 
in this paper, Dewey's views on habituation have less to do 
with external imposition and more to do with organic and 
native responses to problems. 
3. Feinberg, interestingly enough, argues that intellec-
tual curiosity is itself a habit. He is here trying to dispute the 
contrast between socialization and education. The crux of the 
argument is that intellectual curiosity is not perhaps part of a 
formalized education, but rather itself socialization. This 
seems to render more problematic the possibility that a child 
could genuinely and of her own self-interest come to 
embrace a technological and scientific approach to problem-
solving, as Raywid in "the discovery and rejection of indoc-
trination" wants to suggest. Dewey, I would argue, accepts 
neither of these two alternatives exclusively, but (as with 
Raywid) posits that intellectual curiosity, while able to be 
cultivated, yet rises naturally and spontaneously in every 
human organism, yet is also a habit (as with Feinberg), but 
not one that is externally imposed, rather a natural outgrowth 
of the organism. C.F. Dewey, J. (1991). "Logic: The Theory 
of Inquiry." In The Later Works of John Dewey Vol 12. 1938. 
Ed. JoAnn Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Press. Esp. pp. 37-38. 
4. Interestingly enough, Diggins takes the arguments from 
the other side, those that posit a strong authoritarian social 
control predicated upon an expert, professional class, as "a 
surprise." C.F. p. 313. 
5. Dewey, addressing the importance of the profes-
sional class of academics, makes a slightly different argu-
ment as to why this class is important than perhaps Karier 
would. Dewey argues "If security and responsibility of 
intellectual organization are worth anything to the nation, then 
the professors' efforts to get a responsible share in college 
control form a public service." This does not imply that 
professors have a right to the lion's share of public decision-
making, rather only a responsible one. What is responsible is 
of course, not discussed. But it does not imply, I think, that 
Dewey expected professors to be public leaders; rather only 
participants in a greater public discourse about what to value 
and what avenues to pursue. In Dewey, J. (1985). "The Case 
of the Professor and the Public Interest." In The Middle Works 
of John Dewey Vol. 10.1916-1917, edited by JoAnn Boydston. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 164-167. 
esp p. 166. 
6. It is perhaps concluded that Dewey advocated that 
teachers should have more authority to operate unhindered 
from administrative and political concerns. In the main this 
is true. But not because Dewey wanted to rest authority for 
its own sake in teachers, but rather because he felt that teach-
ers were inadequately represented in the broader community, 
and therefore had little voice. For example, Dewey argued 
"...that is the great reason for forming organizations of this 
kind, and organizations which are affiliated with other work-
ing organizations that have power and that attempt to 
exercise the power.. .namely, the reflex effect upon the body 
of the teachers themselves in strengthening their courage, their 
faith in their calling, their faith in one another, and the recog-
nition that they are servants of the community, and not people 
hired by a certain transitory set of people to do a certain job 
at their beck and call." In Dewey, J. (1985). "Professional 
Organization of Teachers." In The Middle Works of John 
Dewey Vol. 10, edited by JoAnn Boydston. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 168-172., p. 169. This 
is also his claim for the call to teachers to increase their as yet 
unheard contributions to the "science" of education that is 
set out in Dewey, J. (1990). "The Sources of a Science of 
Education." In The Later Works of John Dewey, Vol. 5. 1929-
1930, edited by JoAnn Boydston. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, p. 23. 
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